‘The Division of Labour in Society’ by Émile Durkheim - Jurisprudential Analysis of a Selected Excerpt
Introduction
The selected excerpt (pp. 105 - 125) which will be discussed in this essay is from a text entitled ‘The Division of Labour in Society’ (as translated by George Simpson), authored by Émile Durkheim, a French sociologist, originally written in the French language and published in 1893. Durkheim’s doctoral dissertation focussed on what he termed “solidarity”, which was further formulated into “mechanical solidarity” and “organic solidarity”. The original conceptualisation of these two streams of solidarity was rooted in how “social order” is governed and maintained in societies, especially when primitive societies develop into modern industrial ones.
For Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is an element within primitive societies which maintains social order on the basis of a “collective conscience” where individuals 6 as a group maintain order due to their shared beliefs and values, and penalise those who act outside of these common attitudes. Organic solidarity forms when these groups develop into a more secular, liberal, and interdependent society, more focussed on resolving disputes through “restitutive” actions as opposed to “repress[ion]” when dealing with dissenting perspectives.
This essay will be divided into four Parts. Parts 1 and 2 will discuss Durkheim’s arguments with regards to mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity, respectively, and how convincingly these arguments have been made, taking into account the characteristics of the text. Part 3 will discuss both previous Parts and how they influence each other. Finally, Part 4 will conclude the essay. Ultimately, it will be argued that though there are distinguishing criticisms of Durkheim’s text, it is to a great extent that Durkheim’s text is particularly convincing in how modern industrial societies operate.
1. Mechanical Solidarity and Primitive Societies
Durkheim’s use of language in describing mechanical solidarity is quite idiosyncratic with the use of abstract imagery. The adjective “common” describing the noun “conscience” showcases the way in which Durkheim seeks to inform his readership, by denoting that in any given society, there historically has been an acceptable way of thinking which then translates into how they act, hence the adjective. The conscience mind here is a mature and rational one: it mirrors the behaviour of those amongst him. Therefore, the “penal law” is then highlighted as a symbolic institution in order to “penal[ise]” those who act out of the “common conscience”. Consequently, Durkhem’s fascinating use of terminology projects a factual-like narrative, of which there appears to be little to criticise. This is because, historically, English “penal law” was introduced as a mechanism to maintain the Church of England’s influence within the country. Extrapolating this term, it could also be a reference to the criminal law more broadly, including the introduction and enforcement of laws to sustain “social cohesion”, which would then give efficacy to the “common conscience” of a community.
This magnifies Durkheim’s persuasiveness: if the intended readership (upon publication) was for a populace more broadly, as opposed to only the highly educated elite or upper- class echelons of French or European society, then it would be difficult to disagree or outright reject Durkheim’s claims. Further, the objective-like language which Durkheim utilises, such as “[i]t is this solidarity which repressive law expresses” and “[i]t is this force which penal law protects 17 against all enfeeblement, both in demanding from each of us a minimum of resemblances…and in imposing upon us the respect for the symbol which expresses and summarises these resemblances at the same time that it guarantees them” illustrates to the reader that Durkheim has critically analysed, both sociologically and legally, not only the inherent dilemma of the penal law, but also how it is structured in a manner to essentially control behaviour.
Alternatively, one could argue that Durkheim’s analysis of mechanical solidarity is somewhat obstructive. This is because to the common fellow, Durkheim’s coinage of phrases such as “common conscience” which is repeated many times throughout the excerpt symbolises his inherent interest in validating that there is, in fact, a common conscience of some sort. Perhaps what he really meant is that though we all have different thoughts and feelings, we all still obey the law, whether it criminal or civil, in order to maintain social order and prevent anarchy? Instead, Durkheim focuses more on levying criticisms of the 19th-century system, as opposed to highlighting plausible advantages or positives of the penal law, and the criminal law by extension, which may have given his text a greater foundation of neutrality or objectivity in discussing this subject. Still, Durkheim’s text insofar as discussing mechanical solidarity in the excerpt is particularly cogent as a consequence of the strong arguments he makes, including succinctly identifying contextual examples of the common conscience at play which gives rise to mechanical solidarity, including discussing “the general integration of society” and “social life”.
2. Organic Solidarity and Modern Industrial Societies
The shift in linguistic formalities Durkheim argues in Chapter Three of the excerpt is quickly evident: by using terms such as “return in state” and “[d]amage-interests”, Durkheim seeks to shift the previous tone toward a more modern analysis of social order. This is furthered with his statement that “[i]n fact, however, he who loses the litigation pays the damages even when his intentions were pure, even when his ignorance alone was his culpability”.
This shows Durkheim’s still-ever critical nature in his evaluation of the division of labour, which has been a centrality in modern industrial societies, leading to more interdependence and diversification. Despite having laws enacted to pursue civil litigation, it is true that those who lose are those who pay, even if it may otherwise be known implicitly that they are in fact in the ‘right’. This shows an inherent bias in the functionality of the legal system to which Durkheim argues: “[i]t is proof that the rules with a restitutive sanction either do not totally derive from the collective conscience, or are only feeble states of it. Repressive law corresponds to the heart, the centre of the common conscience; laws purely moral are a part less central; finally, restitute law is born in very ex-centric regions whence it spreads further”. This metaphor can, therefore, be extended to society as a whole: where vital organs in the human body correspond to essential societal institutions to ensure its survival. Consequently, Durkheim’s subtle introduction of a more functionalist-centred argument strengthens his approach that such organs “…are not interested solely in individuals”, but instead is interested in “intervention” in order to sustain its “function[ality]”.
Alternatively, Durkheim arguably falls short in appreciating a more comprehensive or holistic approach in evaluating the body analogy in his functionalist approach of viewing society at large. Though looking at the outward (society) towards the inward (each specific individual), Durkheim does not equally appreciate the inward towards the outward. If each specific individual may act essentially as he pleases, it is plausible to assume that a culture-collapse could occur, and anarchy may prevail. This is because without such a “collective conscience” as Durkheim 30 purports, individuals might easily resort to choosing what suits them best selfishly, without any care for the other or society at large. However, even if this is the case, Durkheim eloquently justifies this distinctive conceptualisation: “[t]he involvement of one party results either from involvement assumed by the other, or from some service already rendered by the latter…this reciprocity is possible only where there is co-operation, and that, in its turn, does not come about without the division of labour”. Thus, Durkheim quite clearly justifies his argument to a great extent, while also considering potential criticisms, which therefore translates into a sufficiently convincing text to ponder over.
3. A Reflex Action to Social Order?
The purported view of Durkheim is that as society shifts towards a more modern and industrial outlook, the division of labour begs a level of social cohesion; this contrasts to primitive societies, where this social cohesion is an element of a shared set of normative values. What could be said, therefore, is that it is presumably a consequence of the historical necessity of social cohesion amongst individuals that the division of labour subsequently arose. It is because of the previous trust in one another that society was able to secularise and move away from God-given rules, towards a more liberal and tolerant standpoint, in order to allow freedom of conscience, while at the same time investing sufficient trust in one another to sustain society as a whole. This, in turn, may be termed a ‘reflex action’, where social cohesion is a fundamental instrument in society, and foregoing this may result in societal disruption and disorder.
4. Conclusion
Furthermore, in essence, it may be argued that Durkheim presents a very compelling text, within the confines of the excerpt selected. Durkheim’s arguments are particularly compelling because of his use of metaphors and symbols, conveying to the reader a particular image in their mind of what obedience appears to look like in modern industrial societies. Alternatively, Durkheim’s ability to briefly acknowledge some dissenting perspectives, and rebutting them, provides a persuasive voice towards his readership, in terms of allowing him to show why such perspectives may be compelling, but ultimately unsatisfactory.
Bibliography
Durkheim É, The Division of Labour in Society (George Simpson tr, Macmillan 1933) 105 - 125.
